000 02451cam a2200397 i 4500
001 22144878
003 GSU
005 20230711155318.0
008 210721s2022 nyu b 001 0 eng
010 _a 2021027068
020 _a9780197616093
_q(hardback)
020 _a9780197616109
_q(paperback)
020 _a9780197616116
_q(updf)
020 _z9780197616123
_q(epub)
020 _a9780197616130
_q(oso)
040 _aDLC
_beng
_cDLC
_erda
_dDLC
_dGSU
042 _apcc
050 0 0 _aHC79.H53
_bMOO
082 0 0 _a338.4/76205
_223
100 1 _aMoore, Martin,
_d1970-
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aRegulating Big Tech :
_bpolicy responses to digital dominance /
_cedited by Martin Moore and Damian Tambini.
250 _aFirst edition.
264 1 _aNew York :
_bOxford University Press,
_c[2022]
300 _axii, 368 pages ;
_c24 cm
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520 _a"The market size and strength of the major digital platform companies has invited international concern about how such firms should best be regulated to serve the interests of wider society, with a particular emphasis on the need for new anti-trust legislation. Using a normative innovation systems approach, this paper investigates how current anti-trust models may insufficiently address the value-extracting features of existing data-intensive and platform-oriented industry behaviour and business models. To do so, we employ the concept of economic rents to investigate how digital platforms create and extract value. Two forms of rent are elaborated: 'network monopoly rents' and 'algorithmic rents.' By identifying such rents more precisely, policymakers and researchers can better direct regulatory investigations, as well as broader industrial and innovation policy approaches, to shape the features of platform-driven digital markets"--
_cProvided by publisher.
650 0 _aHigh technology industries
_xGovernment policy.
700 1 _aTambini, Damian,
_eauthor.
776 0 8 _iOnline version:
_aMoore, Martin, 1970-
_tRegulating Big Tech
_b1.
_dNew York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2022]
_z9780197616116
_w(DLC) 2021027069
906 _a7
_bcbc
_corignew
_d1
_eecip
_f20
_gy-gencatlg
942 _2lcc
_cBK
_n0
999 _c1771
_d1771